SRM as a Tool for Climate Security: Competitive Framing and its (Geo)Political Implications

Climate change is increasingly framed as a security issue by actors ranging from defense institutions to international organizations and academic communities. Yet, rather than producing a unified understanding, this securitization has generated a fragmented field structured by competing discourses, with similar dynamics apparent in the solar radiation modification (SRM) subfield.

These discourses differ in what — or who — is considered to be threatened, whether vulnerable populations, nation-states, or ecosystems, and in the types of threats they prioritize, from extreme weather events to displacement or resource conflict. Crucially, such framings are not merely descriptive: they shape policy responses, privilege particular actors and forms of knowledge, and determine who is seen as responsible for addressing climate-related threats.

Within this contested landscape, SRM has emerged as a controversial response to climate change, increasingly framed in security terms. This commentary examines how SRM is integrated into climate security debates and explores the political and geopolitical implications of these framings.

It argues that SRM is framed as a tool for climate security across competing narratives and these framings are inherently political. They shape what is to be protected, which threats are prioritized, and who is seen as responsible for pursuing SRM. 

Over time, these competitive dynamics risk producing patterns of domination and marginalization — particularly if state-centric approaches prevail — risking the sidelining of vulnerable populations, ecosystems, and civil society, while reinforcing technocratic and geostrategic logics. Understanding these framings is therefore essential, as they shape not only meaning but also political practice.

Competing climate security narratives converge in framing SRM as a solution

A preliminary scan of narratives produced by non-state actors (NSAs) involved in the SRM field suggests that their understandings of climate change as a threat are structured around four distinct conceptions of what requires protection — that is, different referent objects of security — which are sometimes combined. Despite these variations, a common pattern emerges: SRM is consistently framed as a means of protection against climate change. In this sense, SRM is constructed as a tool for climate security. This convergence around SRM as a solution, despite divergent perceptions of what ought to be protected, is analytically significant.

These competing narratives can be classified into four categories: (1) an ecological security discourse, centered on the biosphere; (2) a human security discourse, focused on human vulnerability; (3) a national security discourse, oriented toward the protection of the nation-state; and (4) an international security discourse, concerned with the stability of the international order. Building on the work of Matt McDonald, this suggests that NSAs engage with climate change through established climate security discourses.

The following examples, drawn from public communications by NGOs, start-ups, and individual actors involved in the SRM field, illustrate these competing constructions of climate change as a security issue. Rather than offering a formal typology, the aim is to highlight how different narratives frame both the problem (climate change) and its proposed solutions (SRM).

From ecological to human security discourse: protecting the biosphere and humans, or the biosphere for humans?

Narratives framing climate change as a threat to the biosphere and elements within it are widely articulated by various types of NSAs. For instance, the American non-profit SilverLining refers to “Earth system security” as being threatened globally. Similarly, actors such as Anni Pokela from the Finnish climate strategy agency Operaatio Arktis highlight the potential of climate intervention technologies to secure “a safe climate or to protect specific parts of the climate system,” while the German company OHB System suggests that geoengineering could prevent “catastrophic damage to our planet.” These narratives position the biosphere itself as the primary referent object of security.

These ecological framings are often accompanied by concerns for human welfare. For example, the executive director of SilverLining, Kelly Wanser, stresses that rising temperatures also place “the lives and welfare of people around the world at risk,” while Pete Irvine, a Research Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago and founder of SRM360, highlights that creating “an even cooling effect across the world” could reduce temperature-related risks affecting both humans and other species. In these accounts, the protection of the biosphere is conceived together with the protection of human life.

Narratives that combine perceptions of climate change as a threat to both environmental systems and human life are important to highlight, as they raise normative questions about our relationship with nature and the objectives that SRM should pursue. Should the security of the planet and its components be valued intrinsically, or primarily for their role in sustaining human life? These questions have been widely explored in the climate security literature, including by Matt McDonald, who advocates orienting “our concerns and action towards the resilience of ecosystems themselves in the face of direct and immediate effects of climate change.”

Other narratives focus more narrowly on human security, taking humanity as a whole — or particular populations within it — as the primary referent object of security. For instance, the American Israeli start-up Stardust argues that “we are deviating from the safe zone”, requiring a solution that “protects us from overheating.” Focusing on specific populations, Daniele Visioni and Dakota Gruener of the non-profit Reflective argue that “open research can clarify whether a well-governed approach could reduce harm, particularly for the most vulnerable.”

National and international security framings: from state protection to global order

Alongside ecological and human security framings, some NSAs position the nation-state as the primary referent object of security. For instance, SilverLining explicitly links its mission to the promotion of “national security.” In some cases, specific states are identified as being at risk: Páll Gunnarsson describes Iceland as facing an “existential threat” from a potential AMOC collapse and suggests SRM as a possible means of protection. Similarly, the American start-up Sunscreen, which promotes a “heat wave defense system,” frames increasing heatwaves as a threat to America and explicitly connects climate impacts to national defense by proposing applications for military installations. These narratives construct climate change as a matter of state survival and frame SRM as a tool of protection.

Linked to these conceptions of climate change as a threat to national security, there are also understandings of climate change as a threat to transnational referent objects, whose protection is framed as contributing to international peace and order. For example, the Centre for Climate Repair at the University of Cambridge emphasizes that minimizing sea-ice retreat would help protect specific populations in the Arctic and “support geopolitical security and defense globally.” For the Climate Systems Engineering Initiative at the University of Chicago, warming is framed as a serious risk to “economies around the world,” and proposes studying technologies that could reduce those risks. Here, SRM is positioned as a tool not only for national protection, but for preserving international stability and order.

Perceptions of the threats posed by climate change vary considerably, and this has political implications

The preliminary scan of NSAs’ official communications also indicates that perceptions of climate-related threats can vary significantly across narratives. A key distinction lies in whether the threat is framed in terms of the direct effects of climate change, such as heatwaves, rising global temperatures, and extreme weather, or its indirect consequences, including “mass migration, crop failures, and resource conflicts,” as highlighted by Stardust. 

This distinction is not merely descriptive. Framing climate change through its indirect consequences aligns more closely with security and defense logics and may contribute to the development of state-centric and potentially militarized responses. In this sense, narratives emphasizing indirect threats might contribute to supporting the integration of SRM within national security agendas, thereby reinforcing the risks of authority concentration and marginalization raised in this commentary.

Identifying these competing climate security narratives among NSAs in the SRM field is therefore essential. As existing research demonstrates, different climate security discourses enable or constrain particular policy approaches and influence which agents are seen as responsible for addressing climate-related threats. The way climate change is framed thus carries significant political consequences, notably influencing the distribution of authority.

Who gets to act? Authority and legitimacy in SRM climate security narratives

Beyond shaping how climate threats are understood, climate security narratives also define who is responsible for addressing them. A central question in this regard concerns which actors are considered legitimate and capable of responding to security challenges. In the context of climate security — characterized by diverse perspectives and competing discourses - these actors range from states and international organizations to NGOs, local communities, and individuals.

In a field as polarized as SRM, this question becomes even more salient. A preliminary analysis of NSAs’ official communications suggests that academics and nation-states are consistently positioned as central actors, while international organizations, local communities, individuals, and NGOs are only marginally identified as responsible agents for advancing SRM. While this observation does not constitute definitive evidence, it nonetheless provides grounds for discussion.

SRM research is not detached from politics, and vice versa

As a field undergoing active research, it is unsurprising that academics are frequently identified as responsible actors, whether through references to researchers, the scientific community, experts, or scholars. However, this raises critical questions regarding the governance of knowledge production, specifically, what kinds of research are conducted, under what conditions, and with whose oversight. Several initiatives have sought to address this issue, including the 2009 Oxford Principles, the AGU Ethical Framework for Climate Intervention Research, or the recent Solar Geoengineering Research Governance Platform (SGRG). 

A key challenge, however, lies in avoiding the fragmentation of SRM research governance. Insights from environmental governance literature suggest that fragmentation can have significant political consequences. For instance, it may create incentives for forum-shopping, understood as the strategic selection of institutional arenas based on their perceived advantages. In the context of SRM, the proliferation of research governance frameworks may allow both public and private actors to align with those that impose fewer constraints or offer greater strategic benefits, and such dynamics risk undermining coherent oversight.

Beyond identifying who is responsible for action, SRM-related climate security narratives also raise fundamental questions about how knowledge is produced and legitimized. As NSAs frame researchers as key agents in pursuing SRM, it becomes crucial to recognize that the field itself is shaped by dynamics of domination and marginalization — both in terms of the geographical distribution of researchers and the limited inclusion of certain forms of knowledge. The issue, therefore, is not only whether SRM research is justified or legitimate - an ongoing and contested debate - but also who participates in its production and under what conditions.

This concern echoes longstanding critiques of how climate knowledge is produced and mobilized, particularly in relation to the science-policy interface. As Amy Dahan and Hélène Guillemot argue, the linear model traditionally structuring the relationship between science and politics in the climate regime — most notably through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — rests on the assumption that “science and politics are separate and impermeable, which grants science its legitimacy as a foundation for action.”

Yet, as these authors emphasize, no clear separation exists between science and politics in practice: the IPCC “actively contributes to reshaping the field of study, orchestrates a consensus, and promotes certain perspectives,” thereby playing a performative role. This suggests that the ways in which SRM research informs political debates — and is, in turn, shaped by them — should be considered from the outset, especially given that SRM is being constructed by NSAs in the field, including some researchers, as a potential tool for climate security.

Importantly, scholars have also shown that climate knowledge production has often been dominated by institutions and researchers based in the Global North, marginalizing other forms of knowledge and perspectives. These dynamics can shape whose expertise is recognized as legitimate in policy debates and whose knowledge is excluded from decision-making processes. Given the current structuring of the SRM field, such critiques remain highly relevant and should not be overlooked. In this sense, SRM research cannot be understood as a neutral technical endeavor, but must be analyzed as part of broader political struggles over knowledge, authority, and legitimacy.

Abstract states, unclear authority: the politics of SRM decision-making

While SRM-related climate security narratives identify nation-states as key actors, they rarely specify how political authority over SRM would be organized in practice. References range from general mentions of countries as a whole to more specific entities within national political systems, including governments, policy actors, decision-makers, and policymakers. However, little attention is given to the forms of political organization through which such actors would operate, or to the conditions under which their authority would be considered legitimate. In particular, these narratives remain largely silent on whether democratic or authoritarian regimes would be equally entitled to develop or deploy SRM.

As a result, references to nation-states remain highly abstract, leaving key political questions unresolved: how would decisions regarding SRM research or deployment be made, who would ultimately hold decision-making authority, and through which institutional arrangements? 

More broadly, the lack of attention to institutional arrangements reflects a tendency within SRM-related climate security narratives to prioritize technological feasibility over questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability. This further reinforces the technocratic and state-centric dynamics identified throughout this commentary and highlights the risk that decisions with global consequences may be shaped by a narrow set of actors.

Toward inclusive SRM governance: beyond state and expert dominance

A further issue concerns the extent to which NGOs, communities, and individuals are recognized as distinct actors responsible for SRM decision-making. Existing research suggests that ecological and human security perspectives within the climate-security nexus often extend responsibility beyond states to include such actors. Yet, in the communications examined here, they appear only marginally. While this observation should not be taken as definitive evidence, it raises important questions. 

This possible absence should invite further scrutiny. Some initiatives explicitly seek to counter this possibility. For instance, DSG emphasizes the inclusion and empowerment of communities, arguing that decisions on SRM must be legitimate, and that legitimacy requires that “those most affected have real agency to shape a decision if they choose to.” While such efforts are important, they also raise the question of whether they will be sufficient to counter broader structural dynamics, particularly if responsibility for addressing climate risks through SRM continues to be embedded within state-centric and expert-driven frameworks.

Climate security narratives advanced by NSAs in the SRM field do more than define what or who is under threat, identify SRM as a potential response, and assign responsibility for research and/or potential deployment. They also shape how SRM may be institutionalized - that is, translated into concrete practices and governance arrangements - and, in doing so, influence which actors and perspectives may be marginalized. This underscores the importance of examining how competing climate security narratives have translated into practice, and with what political consequences.

From plural discourses to state dominance: the evolution of national climate security framings

Identifying different conceptions of climate security within the SRM field is not sufficient; it also raises questions about how these competing discourses might evolve over time. Which framings are most likely to shape the development and governance of SRM? What are the implications if certain discourses come to dominate, marginalizing others - and, in turn, the referent objects they seek to protect?

Evidence from the broader climate security literature suggests that state-centric framings tend to become dominant, often at the expense of ecological and human-centered perspectives. Studies of the United States and Germany, for example, show a shift toward territorial and national security framings of climate change, accompanied by corresponding changes in policy priorities. Similar dynamics can be observed in my own research on France, where climate change has increasingly been framed as a threat to national and international security, while ecological and human-centered perspectives have become less prominent.

Taken together, these findings suggest that competition between climate security discourses can generate processes of domination and marginalization, shaping how climate change is understood and how responses are prioritized. In several national contexts, this has occurred at the expense of ecological security perspectives and has been associated with policy orientations that prioritize adaptation, risk management, and strategic interests, while sidelining efforts to address the structural causes of climate change. These dynamics are particularly relevant for SRM, as the dominance of state-centric security framings may facilitate its integration into defense institutions and the sidelining of mitigation measures.

The limits of exposure: how state-centric climate security narratives risk fostering competition

It is important to situate the construction of SRM as a climate security tool with those insights from different national contexts. If state-centric discourses were to dominate how SRM is framed, what would this imply for the protection of referent objects that fall outside such frameworks, such as ecosystems or other living beings? Which alternative responses might be marginalized as a result? Would competing protection of national interests necessarily be compatible?

These questions are essential, yet remain difficult to answer. Further analysis is needed to better understand how nation-states that frame climate change as a national security threat conceptualize SRM as a response. Nevertheless, reflecting on the implications of state-centric framings of SRM remains crucial, particularly in order to anticipate their potential geopolitical consequences.

A related issue concerns the potential for competition between different national perspectives on climate change as a threat, and how SRM might be promoted and justified in response to specific national objectives. In this regard, Páll Gunnarsson’s characterization of populations affected by a potential AMOC collapse as “the most exposed population” can be questioned. The notion of exposure alone is insufficient to capture a population’s capacity to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change. The concept of vulnerability appears more appropriate, as it encompasses not only exposure, but also the sensitivity and adaptive capacity of a territory and its population.

In other words, while exposure to climate change impacts may be widespread, vulnerability varies significantly across regions and within populations. This calls for caution when advancing national security framings based primarily on exposure, and when presenting SRM as a corresponding tool of protection. Such framings risk fostering competitive dynamics between states and populations by privileging territorial exposure over broader considerations of vulnerability, while obscuring critical differences in sensitivity and adaptive capacity. In this context, SRM may be framed not as a collective global response, but as a strategic tool aligned with national interests, potentially reinforcing competitive approaches to climate intervention.

Beyond climate security: SRM integration into geopolitical and strategic competition

SRM is not only integrated into forms of thinking centered on national security, as illustrated above or in the communications of the Sunscreen start-up presented earlier. It is also integrated into broader geopolitical and great-power competition logics. This is notably reflected in a recent report by the Rainey Center and SilverLining, which presents the potential development and deployment of SRM by foreign actors — particularly China — as a national security risk. It advocates for the development of “weather sovereignty,” understood as the capacity to observe, attribute, and interpret changes in “our own” atmosphere.

Notably, and somewhat paradoxically, this report — despite its extensive discussion of SRM — does not mention climate change or rising temperatures even once. This suggests that the securitization of SRM may extend beyond its construction as a tool for climate security. In other words, approaches to SRM can vary significantly and should not be understood solely as a technological response to climate change. The emphasis on “weather sovereignty” illustrates how climate change itself can be sidelined, while the development of SRM-related national capacities is actively promoted. This observation directly echoes the argument advanced in my previous piece for DSG, which highlighted the possibility that planetary SRM could emerge as a novel instrument of state power.

This commentary has shown that SRM is being constructed as a tool for climate security through competing discourses that define what is to be protected, from what type of threats, and who is responsible for action. These framings are not neutral: they carry significant political and geopolitical implications.

Evidence from the broader climate security field suggests that such discursive competition can produce dynamics of domination over time, particularly as state-centric framings gain prominence. These dynamics risk marginalizing ecological and human-centered perspectives, concentrating authority among states and experts, and sidelining those most affected by climate change and potential SRM deployment.

At the same time, the emerging integration of SRM into geopolitical and strategic narratives suggests that it may increasingly be shaped by logics of competition and sovereignty, rather than by claimed efforts to address climate change. In this context, SRM risks evolving from a proposed controversial and uncertain response to climate change into an instrument of power within an international system under deep reconfiguration.

This commentary provides a preliminary exploration of the security politics of SRM. A more comprehensive academic analysis is currently underway to examine these dynamics in greater depth, while future work will also consider how these findings might inform DSG’s engagement activities and contribute to the development of reflexive approaches to stakeholder engagement.