Africa’s High-Stakes Discourse on SRM: Risks, Responsibilities, and Regional Realities

Global climate action impacts African climate needs

There is no question that global powers, those most responsible for the climate crisis, must urgently reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and significantly increase investments in adaptation and loss and damage to protect lives, livelihoods, and the ecosystems that sustain them, particularly among climate vulnerable communities and nations. This is especially true for the African continent, which faces disproportionate impacts from a warming planet, despite its limited contributions to GHG emissions. The resulting loss of GDP and diversion of government budgets towards climate disaster response is actively pushing African nations off their sustainable development pathways.

As the climate crisis worsens, global commitments to mitigate GHG emissions remain far below the required amount to stave off higher climate risks for Africa; further, climate investments, specifically into adaptation measures, are an order of magnitude lower than necessary to ensure African climate resilience. Within this context, scientific, civic, and policy groups are beginning to pay more attention to Solar Radiation Modification (SRM), also known as solar geoengineering, including some African stakeholders.

Connecting SRM to African perspectives

SRM refers to large-scale, intentional approaches to increase the amount of sunlight reflected into space to cool the planet rapidly. Two leading techniques currently under consideration are stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), which involves releasing tiny reflective particles into the upper atmosphere, and marine cloud brightening (MCB), which aims to enhance the reflectivity of clouds over oceans by using sea salt particles. 

Proponents of SRM (largely research focused, not deployment) view it as a potential complementary tool worth exploring within the broader climate response toolbox that may reduce climate impacts (and related suffering) for vulnerable regions like Africa, while buying time to scale up mitigation and GHG emissions removal. Those opposed to it warn that such interventions do not address the GHG emissions responsible for climate change, distract from the necessary climate action urgently needed, and pose serious environmental, socioeconomic, geopolitical, and justice risks for vulnerable communities and nations.

Scientific consensus on the impacts of SRM at the global level is, thus far, limited to climate modeling and assessments, highlighting significant uncertainties. Some lab scale experiments (i.e., Simons Foundation SRM Research Program) and small-scale experiments are occurring/slated (i.e., in the Great Barrier Reef, and through the United Kingdom Advanced Research and Invention Agency’s Exploring Climate Cooling Programme) or were cancelled (i.e., Harvard University’s Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment, and University of Washington’s MCB experiment in Alameda, USA). The broad conclusion from this body of work is that SAI and MCB can, in principle, reduce global average temperatures to levels closer to pre-industrial conditions, though many questions about overall effectiveness, other impacts, and deployment strategies remain. This effect is robust across models; adding reflective particles into the stratosphere or sea salt aerosols into low-lying marine clouds produces a measurable cooling signal compared to the globally averaged warming projected under high GHG emissions scenarios. Additionally, regional disparities persist, where certain regions may continue to experience higher warming, while others may face amplified shifts in rainfall, storm tracks, or monsoon behavior, to name a few. The literature also underscores that while SRM may lessen some risks, such as sea level rise, cryosphere melt, or heat extremes, it does little to directly solve ocean acidification or the political challenges of multilateral climate governance. The underlying message is that SRM would reshape climate risks in uneven ways, producing trade-offs rather than uniform benefits.

SRM science in Africa presents no clear answers, highlights gaps

Within these complexities, African scientists have increasingly taken on the challenge of interrogating how SRM might affect the continent’s uniquely vulnerable climates and societies. In recent years, more than thirty peer-reviewed studies led by African research teams have started to generate the first continent-wide picture of SRM’s possible consequences, with grant support from The Degrees Initiative, a UK-based charity dedicated to increasing SRM scientific capacity in the Global South, currently with 16 teams conducting research across 12 African countries. Notable from a shifting funding dynamics perspective, additional funders are coming to the table, with some research on Africa as part of their SRM portfolios, with the Simons Foundation, as one example.

Methodologically, most of these studies rely on global climate model ensembles such as Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), Geoengineering Large Ensemble Project (GLENS), or Assessing Responses and Impacts of Solar intervention on the Earth system with Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (ARISE-SAI). Collectively, these studies provide critical insights while also highlighting how much remains uncertain. Importantly, these African-led investigations have focused on SAI. Though studied at the global level, MCB has not yet been thoroughly studied by African climate modeling assessments.

The research provides the case for an overall cooling effect on Africa; it also explores a wide set of variables, indices and themes across the continent’s subregions, with the dual reality of benefits and risks the core feature of all studies on SRM. African monsoon changes see rainfall suppressed under SRM as compared to high-emissions climate change-driven scenarios, heightening drought risks in some areas (like Western Africa), reducing flood risks in others (like Northern Sahel). This is primarily due to a reduced land-sea thermal contrast, which leads to weakened monsoon circulation, and highlights that deployment may “overcompensate” on precipitation when bringing temperature to pre-industrial levels, bringing into stark focus the need for more African research to determine what deployment strategies (if any) minimize risks and maximize benefits for the continent. 

Central African river basins show moderate temperature extremes but altered hydrological regimes, with increasing potential water availability by up to 50% over major basins like the Congo and Cameroon Atlantic, especially when compared to high-emissions climate change-driven scenarios, adding new layers to policy planning for future water storage options. Similarly, coastal upwelling intensity in the Gulf of Guinea, resulting from shifts in sea surface temperature, still increases, but significantly less as compared to high-emissions climate change-driven scenarios; such risk reductions may potentially impact fisheries productivity and associated food security and livelihoods. 

In Eastern Africa, multiple papers indicate some heat-related stresses are reduced, but here, rainfall in the March-April-May season, critically important for agriculture and food security, becomes more widespread and heavier over much of the region, necessitating caution with how African policy makers approach these technologies. Health factors like vector-borne diseases, and climate extremes like heatwaves and compound drought/flood hazards that result from storm tracks are all similarly complex.

These analyses consistently reveal that SRM does not simply ‘cool the planet’ or blunt the rise of certain extremes; it would introduce new uncertainties and redistribute climate risks according to a new, human-designed blueprint. The conclusion is that no single “African response” to SRM exists, and that scientific uncertainty itself is creating a political battlefield – a result of climate outcomes differing sharply by geography and by the details of how SRM is implemented.

These global models are often downscaled or tailored to regional contexts, removing biases resulting from coarse climate model resolution that may overlook local climate specificity. African scientists have not only applied these models but also pushed them further, focusing on indices most relevant to the continent: agricultural growing season lengths, water deficit days, malaria suitability, and ocean upwelling strength, among others. This body of work marks a significant change from Africa being absent or subordinate in SRM literature to Africa producing original, context-driven knowledge. However, these collective findings also emphasize caution. The effects captured are often highly model-dependent, and policy decisions around SAI research and potential deployment must account for significant model uncertainty. They suggest more studies with more models and ensembles to better determine impacts, while also urging to assess SAI technologies in a holistic manner, due to their ecosystem, socioeconomic, geopolitical and ethical implications – a point raised in nearly all such studies, in Africa and globally.

The uneven pattern of benefits and harms, the deep uncertainties in precipitation and hydrology, and the lack of models’ resolution at local scales means that African communities will face difficult choices in evaluating SRM, and considerations around its inclusion in the climate response portfolio. What is clear is that African voices and African science are now establishing themselves into the global conversation on SRM, although with far fewer resources available for scientific investigation, science-to-policy communications, and development of civil perspectives and action on how the risks and trade-offs of SRM are processed locally, regionally and globally. 

The dual reality of potential benefits and harms is not a neutral scientific conclusion. In the evolving climate risks context, it is foundational evidence for both the pragmatic SRM engager, who sees these technologies as tools to be understood, and perhaps optimized, and the principled refuser, who sees an unacceptable gamble. The ambiguity of the science, something conventional climate science has struggled with historically, continues to fuel the discourse around SRM, in Africa, and the world over. 

African SRM research is not purely scientific, but also politically structured

Despite tremendous concerns, global momentum around SRM research and governance is growing, while simultaneously, recent political dynamics (such as the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement) are shifting the world away from necessary climate action. Whether or not SRM is eventually pursued, decisions taken around its research and technology development/readiness will have far-reaching implications for Africa. Ultimately, SRM is more than just about achieving scientific certainty; indeed, its governance has greater urgency, with questions like who decides, under what principles, and with whose consent? Ignoring SRM altogether does not stop its progress or shield the continent from the consequences of its deliberations or developments, be it for use or non-use.

Against this backdrop, the expanding discourse on the African continent on issues related to SRM is telling. Even amid urgent adaptation and development priorities, persistent engagement on SRM by the continent’s various stakeholders is a signal of the intertwined nature of the pursuit of these technologies with climate justice and sustainable development. 

African governance of SRM is about justice and sovereignty under shifting power dynamics

Generally speaking, Africa’s engagement with SRM governance is still at an early stage. Active involvement from African policymakers, scientists, civil society, and the media reflects increasing awareness of SRM’s potential risks, uncertainties, and governance challenges, with respect to the continent's overarching needs. However, participation in international governance discussions remains limited to only a few voices from the continent thus far. This limited engagement is the result of structural constraints, limited scientific capacity, restricted access to information, and constrained bandwidth for participation in international forums, factors found in multiple other sustainable development domains, too. 

Despite these challenges, some African leaders have made their concerns heard on the international stage. For example, at the 2023 and 2025 sessions of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), their ministers expressed opposition to SRM and called for a global governance mechanism aimed at its non-use. Moreover, at the 2024 Sixth Session of the United Nations Environment Assembly in Nairobi, African delegates, as a bloc, engaged with strong opinions on a Swiss-led resolution on SRM, calling for a repository of information and capacity to engage on SRM effectively. The resolution was ultimately withdrawn, cementing the continent’s cautious stance. Nonetheless, characterizing African governments’ coordinated resistance in these forums as precaution does not paint a complete picture. It is crucial to also understand that their stance is the result of strategic measures to fill the governance vacuum around these technologies. By asserting non-use, the African Group of Negotiators are saying ‘no’ and pre-emptively establishing the initial terms and rules around the SRM debate and developments. As the ‘weaker’ set of political entities who lack the technological and economic power to compete on SRM deployment, a normative boundary like this is one of the few lynchpins available for the African bloc to force wealthier, key nations to respond more fairly and proactively on global SRM governance.  

This principled African caution mirrors broader global trends and influences on SRM. For example, while the Union of Concerned Scientists encourages modeling research, observational studies, and inclusive public participation in any future small-scale experiments, it is opposed to SRM deployment due to its high environmental, social, and geopolitical risks. Similarly, in December 2024, the European Union’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors recommended a moratorium on large-scale SRM tests, urged a global governance treaty, and called for periodic policy reviews. Alongside multiple other calls for precaution, these examples rest on the conclusions drawn by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the highest scientific body on the subject. The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report specifically noted these concerns, emphasizing that SRM could introduce widespread and poorly understood risks to both ecosystems and human societies, particularly in Africa, and opposed deployment while cautiously encouraging research and governance. SRM will be more heavily explored in the IPCC’s Seventh Assessment Report, indicating the need for serious evidence building on its potential risks and benefits to inform policymakers about temperature overshoot and stabilization pathways before any decisions around technology development and potential deployment should surface.

While the dominant rejection posture remains strong among African policymakers on the global stage, a continuous approach also at play warns that avoiding SRM entirely could leave Africa without influence over impacts the continent may feel from decisions made elsewhere. Broadly, the discourse balances regional priorities and interests while advocating for justice principles and African perspectives in shaping SRM governance frameworks, revealing a growing maturity in African climate thought, one marked by diversity, depth, and ethical clarity. The core of the debate, therefore, is transcending governance towards epistemic sovereignty as a function of climate justice. The right and ability of African nations to produce, validate, and own the knowledge that will determine their climate future is not only about who governs SRM and who gets a vote, but about what models, risk assessment frameworks, definitions of ‘benefit’, and values are deemed necessary and legitimate. Arriving at African-led and funded research would be a practical assertion of this sovereignty that would aid in bringing epistemic justice into global climate and SRM decision making.

A maturing, plural African discourse on SRM

Two recent interventions published in Project Syndicate by Okereke and Bassey, and Fakir and Talati, illustrate how debates over responsible leadership on SRM are being shaped in and around Africa. Though just two among many writings on SRM and Africa, these articles, through their thorough exploration of critical issues and their clear, comparative framing, offer a compelling lens through which to examine Africa’s role in emerging SRM debates. Both texts engage Africa’s ethical, strategic, and leadership imperatives in the face of growing global interest in SRM, yet their strategies diverge sharply, resulting in distinct pathways for African agency. 

At the heart of the discussion lie two contrasting, yet complementary, visions of leadership. Okereke and Bassey advance principled refusal, arguing that Africa must reject SRM experimentation to safeguard climate justice. They note that SRM distracts from genuine climate solutions, reinforces colonial power dynamics, and risks reproducing the very injustices that have long constrained Africa’s development. Their rhetorical strategy is morally charged and historically conscious, invoking metaphors such as “playing God” and “colonial experiment” to remind readers that technological ambition cannot be disentangled from power dynamics. For Okereke and Bassey, leadership means the courage to say “no” in defense of justice, integrity, and self-determination. In their view, even participation in SRM research risks legitimizing a technology that has extremely high potential to further exacerbate climate injustices and inequities. For them, research on SRM itself is suspect and a possible tool of Northern dominance, and de-normalizing or rejecting it is an expression of African leadership and agency.

Fakir and Talati, by contrast, frame SRM not as a moral threat but as a governance challenge that demands strategic preparedness and engagement. They advocate for informed African participation in SRM without endorsement. For them, absence from the SRM debate means exclusion from the rules, risks, and decisions that will inevitably shape the continent’s climate future. They call for procedural engagement that focuses on building knowledge, institutional capacity, and equitable governance structures so that Africa can shape SRM (for use or non-use) rather than be shaped by it. Their language is comparatively measured and procedural, using terms such as “transparent and equitable approach,” “governance frameworks,” and “institutional capacity.” Leadership, in their view, lies in the ability to design, negotiate, and regulate, rather than simply resist. Their approach buckets research, knowledge, and participation as protective tools that can deliver agency to Africans to influence outcomes associated with SRM deliberations and mitigate risks, rather than suffer consequences. Informed participation. They conclude that Africa’s inclusion and influence in global SRM governance frameworks reduces its risks from marginalization. 

Shared foundations highlight the productive tension on African climate leadership

While the strategies and conclusions of these two articles diverge, both rest on a shared ethical foundation. Each is anchored in a moral and political commitment to justice, ethics, and African agency. Both insist that Africa’s urgent climate priorities, such as energy access, adaptation, mitigation, and a just transition, must not be displaced by SRM. They express parallel concerns about the diversion of resources from immediate climate action and employ strikingly similar language to describe how Global North actors dominate SRM discourse, research, development, and governance, articulating how this asymmetry reproduces structural inequities and epistemic marginalization of Global South actors. These rhetorical parallels reveal a shared commitment to addressing climate injustice that grounds both texts.

From this convergence emerges a clear imperative: Africa must not serve as a passive testing ground for externally driven technologies. Instead, SRM deliberations must be guided by principles of transparency, accountability, justice, and sovereignty. The divergence between the two articles, therefore, does not lie in their ethical commitments but in their strategies for realizing them, with each offering a different pathway to uphold African agency in confronting the complex, high-stakes challenges that SRM presents.

While both articles focus on SRM, they reveal the growing complexity and diversity of Africa’s role in climate policy, governance, and leadership. Together, the perspectives generate a productive tension that enables African stakeholders to both critique and participate in shaping global climate governance, particularly as they confront ongoing climate injustices and grapple with how they may be exacerbated by emerging technologies (not just SRM, but Artificial Intelligence as well, for one). Viewed from this lens, this tension is not a sign of fragmentation, but evidence of a continent debating its future on its own terms, guided by diverse but convergent visions of justice and agency. Furthermore, the cases made in these two articles embody the evolving maturity of African climate discourse, one that is grounded in democratic debate, ethical reflection, and critical reasoning. The coexistence of oppositional and pragmatic approaches ensures that Africa’s engagement with SRM, whether through rejection or active engagement, remains critically informed, and democratically grounded. Far from division, this pluralism embodies healthy discourse in research and governance. It provides a platform for self-determination on the continent that must hold space for both principled refusal and strategic engagement, while ensuring that African needs, priorities, and agency remain central to SRM and other global climate deliberations. 

Conclusion 

As SRM shifts from a niche idea to a central topic in global climate debates, Africa finds itself directly in its path. Ignoring SRM altogether does not stop its progress or shield the continent from the consequences of its development, use, or non-use. Yet, there remain no clear answers to fundamental questions, partly due to ongoing scientific uncertainties on the wide range of potential impacts outlined above, as well as stymied governance, not only around whether to or not to pursue this course of action, but also in the what, where, when, and how of research and potential deployment. For that reason, the arguments presented in the two articles analysed above hold significant societal value. The coexistence of these two perspectives offers examples of how the continent can navigate emerging climate technologies while ensuring its priorities, values, and developmental needs remain central to such deliberations. 

Ultimately, the African discourse on SRM is delivering a clear message to not mistake a lack of uniform consensus for a lack of sophistication. The continent is navigating this dilemma within the confines of the necessary pluralism that reflects the complexity of the climate and SRM threats themselves. The question is not if Africa has a voice, but whether the world, accustomed to simplifying the continent’s perspectives, is prepared to listen to the broad spectrum of views coming from the continent. Whether through governance frameworks or moral red lines, for African peoples, ensuring that their agency and priorities remain at the heart of climate and SRM deliberations will continue to produce strong discourse – one that deserves to be followed closely.