How SRM Intersects with Geopolitics and Security

Often referred to as solar geoengineering, solar radiation modification (SRM) is commonly framed by some public and private actors involved in the field as a potential “last resort” technological response to worsening climate change impacts, the result of rising greenhouse gas emissions and associated global surface temperatures. This framing does more than describe a set of technical proposals; it also shapes how SRM is understood, approached, and situated within broader climate change governance debates.

Of particular importance is how this framing may obscure SRM’s potential consequences for international relations and security dynamics. SRM development and potential deployment are embedded in existing power relations, strategic rivalries, and security dynamics. Ignoring these dimensions risks underestimating the implications of SRM for international relations and global stability. Therefore, pursuing SRM within the current geopolitical context without sustained attention to these issues is not only misleading but also irresponsible.

As debates grow regarding the legitimacy and accuracy of framing SRM as a security issue, it is unsurprising that these questions resist simple “yes” or “no” answers. In this context, highlighting the distinction between an analytical and descriptive claim of SRM (as embedded in and generating geopolitical and security implications) from a normative one (how actors and institutions should behave and respond) is useful to capture where and how SRM intersects with geopolitics and security.

Eroding multilateralism and expanding hybrid warfare undermine cooperative approaches to SRM governance 

International relations are marked by an erosion of multilateralism, a subsequent rise of transactional approaches to international relations, violations of the rules-based international order, and evolutions in the nature and intensity of contemporary conflicts. This context directly affects the prospects for coordinated and cooperative approaches to SRM governance and deployment. Because SRM approaches would have transboundary effects, they would require high levels of trust, transparency, and cooperation. Yet these are precisely the elements that are being weakened in today’s international system.

Recent events and developments, such as Russia’s invasion of Crimea and Ukraine and the United States (US)’ threats to take control of Greenland, highlight the growing strain placed on the post–World War II liberal international order, its institutions, and international law. Trump’s creation of a Board of Peace further exemplifies this transformation. Together, these dynamics suggest a world in which non-cooperative and coercive practices are increasingly normalized - conditions that are particularly problematic for SRM approaches, that would ideally rely on collective consent and international governance.

At the same time, the nature of warfare itself is evolving. Contemporary conflicts increasingly combine conventional and non-conventional means, contributing to what is often described as a “blurring of the line between peace and war.” These dynamics are commonly captured by the concept of hybrid warfare, which - despite the absence of a universal definition - generally refers to coordinated military and non-military practices aimed at destabilizing an adversary society as a whole. Hybrid warfare is characterized by reliance on non-state actors, information technologies, and ambiguity surrounding detection and attribution. These features are particularly relevant when assessing the potential security implications of SRM, as they shape how uncertainty, suspicion, and deniability can be exploited.  

Climate (in)action is being strategically leveraged, reconfiguring the context for SRM 

In parallel, international cooperation on climate change is undergoing significant strain. The adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 marked a milestone, and despite its shortcomings, it helped shape domestic emissions trajectories and reduce projected warming relative to a scenario without cooperation. However, by 2025, climate cooperation entered a new phase, increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry - most notably between China and the US. The two superpowers openly oppose one another’s worldviews, using energy dependencies and vulnerabilities as tools of strategic leverage. China dominates supply chains for energy transition technologies, while the Trump II administration assumes and implements an energy dominance strategy aimed at maintaining and expanding fossil fuel use. 

In this context, climate action itself has become a target of US foreign and domestic policy, with pressure exerted not only on adversaries but also on allies that fail to align with US strategic priorities. Moreover, climate science, scientists, and climate governance institutions have also come under direct attack, with consequences extending well beyond US borders. The US withdrawal from key international organizations organizing cooperation on climate change affected two core pillars of global climate governance: trust and solidarity. As Olaf Corry notes, such behavior is “not unique, nor surprising,” but its effects on cooperation are nonetheless profound. Against this backdrop, SRM development must be situated in an international landscape where energy systems and climate (in)action are increasingly instrumentalized for strategic leverage and power projection. 

The securitization of climate change is shaping how SRM is understood, justified, and potentially legitimized as an emergency intervention 

At the same time, climate change is increasingly framed as a security issue. While there is no consensus on what exactly constitutes “climate security,” competing narratives shape policy responses by defining which threats matter and who or what requires protection.  Such competing narratives are hardly surprising, as the notion of security is employed differently depending on political interests, which also differ through time and history. Yet, these differences are politically consequential, as framing choices influence the tools deemed appropriate to address climate risks. This debate is directly relevant to SRM. Just as concerns exist that SRM could deter mitigation efforts, similar concerns have emerged within climate security debates, where securitization may prioritize adaptation and emergency responses over emissions reductions. 

The securitization of climate change also raises questions on how SRM may thus be apprehended as an exceptional climate security practice - one that promises protection against climate-related risks. In particular, concerns are raised about how SRM - particularly planetary SRM through Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) - could align with preemptive security logics. As Danielle Young argues, framing climate change as an emergency may legitimize interventions such as SAI “without adequate consideration of the potential consequences”. These dynamics shape both the development of SRM technologies and the security environments in which they may eventually be deployed.

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Most models assume that SRM deployment would occur following some type of global cooperation and agreement among the international community. However, the preceding analysis of geopolitical fragmentation, strained climate cooperation, and securitized climate politics suggests that disagreement and non-cooperative approaches must instead be anticipated. 

Disagreements over whether, how, and where to deploy SRM constitute a major source of geopolitical tension 

A first source of geopolitical tension stems from disagreements over whether SRM should be deployed at all. Even if a consensus was reached on its use, disputes would likely arise over deployment modalities. These disagreements reflect divergent assessments of national interests, shaped not only by projected climatic effects, but also by broader foreign policy, economic, strategic, or security considerations.

Contestation could arise over the conditions of deployment, such as commitments to decarbonisation or the definition of the temperature objective to be pursued; whether stabilizing global temperatures or actively pursuing cooling. Dispute could also be linked to the technology choice, deployment location, and implementation methods. In the case of SAI, this includes disagreements over chemical substances, injection altitudes, and delivery systems. These choices are inherently geopolitical, as they determine the distribution of risks, benefits, and control among states.

The prospects of disagreements also concern regional SRM approaches, such as those focusing on the Arctic region that trigger increasing attention and debates. This region constitutes an illustrative case of how SRM can add another layer of contestation to an already competitive environment, where different states pursue diverging national interests.

Attribution uncertainty around SRM’s environmental effects could be actively exploited in international and domestic politics

Beyond disagreements over deployment, tensions may arise from the perceived or actual environmental consequences of SRM, as this set of technologies notably affects temperatures and precipitation patterns. A central issue here is the difficulty of attributing with certainty the occurrence of specific climate-related events - floods, droughts, heatwaves, storms - to SRM interventions, climate change, or natural variability. Those attribution/suspicion dynamics are already observable with weather modification technologies, fuelling existing tensions. One illustrative example is Iran’s repetitive accusations towards Israël, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and, more recently, the United States, to deliberately manipulate the weather to steal their clouds and cause droughts.  

Domestically, blaming external actors for climate disasters can deflect responsibility from public authorities. Internationally, attribution uncertainty creates opportunities for strategic blame, coercion, and narrative manipulation. But in a context of expanding hybrid warfare practices, attribution uncertainty also provides fertile ground for misinformation and disinformation. Attribution ambiguity can be actively exploited to justify hostile behavior, demands for compensation, or retaliatory measures, while third parties may also exploit these situations for strategic gain, using disinformation campaigns to weaken state responses and erode public trust. What is already observable around extreme climate events provides an example of how SRM could intensify existing tensions. In this sense, SRM might act as an additional layer of complexity in international relations - and might also be used for broader political strategies. 

Even before trials or deployment, suspicion is already emerging around SRM, indicating that it is being incorporated into domestic politics and conflict narratives. In the US, conspiracy theories related to “chemtrails” are shaping political discourse and contributing to proposals for “geoengineering” bans. A different dynamic can be observed elsewhere: in February 2025, the Palestinian Institute for Climate Strategy accused the US–Israeli startup Stardust Solutions of having begun outdoor testing, raising concerns that such tests “might be used over Gaza.” The significance of these examples lies less in the veracity of the claims than in the fact that SRM is increasingly perceived as a politically and strategically charged technology vulnerable to suspicion.

In a weakening international order, disputes over SRM risk escalation and instrumentalization within coercive and hostile strategies

How disagreements and tensions around SRM would be managed remains an open question. States can rely on a wide range of maneuvers to advance their interests and manage tense situations, situated along a continuum ranging from negotiation to coercion and sometimes used in combination. Their effectiveness and consequences, however, depend largely on the relative power of the states involved. At the lower end of this continuum are political, diplomatic, and normative responses, including the recall of ambassadors, the suspension of diplomatic dialogues, or recourse to arbitration mechanisms.

However, in the context of an eroding multilateral order, it is increasingly relevant to consider the possibility that states may resort to more coercive or offensive measures. These include economic and commercial instruments such as sanctions, trade restrictions, tariffs, and demands for financial compensation. Escalation could further involve hybrid warfare practices, including the strategic manipulation of information or more overt military actions aimed at deterring or neutralizing specific infrastructures, such as aircraft or surveillance satellites. Consequently, the deployment of SRM carries significant risks of tension and escalation, including the potential for interstate conflict and its instrumentalization within hostile strategies.

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The preceding sections primarily address the anticipated implications of SRM deployment; however, the development phase of SRM technologies - already in progress - must likewise be analyzed through a geopolitical perspective, with attention to their role in shaping power relations and competitive dynamics.

Polarization, power asymmetries, and limited transparency in  SRM research carry significant geopolitical implications

Like other emerging technologies, the SRM field is marked by significant polarization within the research community, with potential spillover into policy debates. Such polarization may translate into divergent official state positions on SRM development, especially as the field approaches an experimental phase in 2026. Moreover, the field is characterized by dynamics of domination and marginalization, notably in terms of researchers’ backgrounds and locations, the sites of knowledge production, and the origins of funding. Scientists and institutions from the Global North dominate the field, having received roughly fifty times more funding than their counterparts in the Global South. Until recently, funding has been driven largely by private philanthropy, though this landscape is evolving with the UK ARIA’s £56.8 million program -  representing the largest public funding effort to date - and the $60 million raised by the US-Israeli startup Stardust Solutions to develop a “full-stack” SRM solution.

These dynamics of domination and marginalization are key to consider from an ethical, moral and justice standpoint, something many scholars and other actors are already working on, including DSG. But they also have geopolitical significance. Indeed, control over SRM knowledge and capabilities shapes who sets research agendas, who defines risks, who owns critical information, and who becomes dependent on external expertise or technologies. Stardust Solutions’ refusal to disclose details of its activities highlights the extent to which the field relies on the voluntary transparency and goodwill of its participants. Indeed, assessments of the SRM field rely primarily on open-source and publicly disclosed information and are therefore inherently limited. In particular, access to data on funding, research projects, and official policy positions from Russia and China remains scarce and difficult to obtain.

Security and defence actors’ involvement in SRM development heightens the risks of militarization, secrecy, and non-cooperative dynamics 

Closely related to the lack of transparency among certain actors, the SRM field displays a distinctive feature that is particularly relevant for assessing its geopolitical implications: the involvement of security and defence actors. These actors have not only already identified SRM as a potentially disruptive technology - as evidenced by commissioned reports and official documents assessing its security implications - but in some cases also contribute directly to its development through funding or technical support.

Moreover, military and security actors would likely play a role in any future deployment of SRM, raising the prospect of its militarization. Their involvement will likely be necessary to ensure the long-term protection of the infrastructures mobilized for SRM, which may constitute strategic vulnerabilities and thus become targets of physical or cyberattacks. Energy systems and other critical infrastructures - such as pipelines or undersea electricity and communication cables - are already increasingly targeted, and in some cases prioritized, in hybrid warfare practices. Ultimately, militarization also risks reinforcing secrecy, suspicion, and competitive dynamics, two dynamics that heighten the likelihood of non-cooperative approaches to this set of technologies.

From a realist perspective, planetary SRM may emerge as a novel instrument of state power and reshape international relations 

Closely linked to the involvement of security and defence actors in the development of SRM is the question of how this set of technologies - particularly planetary SRM - is integrated into strategic thinking and power considerations. To begin addressing this issue, it is useful to draw on insights from realist approaches to international relations. Although realism has been subject to substantial and well-founded criticism, and despite the emergence of other theoretical frameworks, it remains a relevant lens for analysing SRM insofar as it reflects how the most powerful states tend to perceive, interpret, and act upon emerging technologies in contemporary world politics. 

From a realist perspective, emerging technologies are rarely viewed as neutral tools but as potential sources of leverage. Beyond the potential role of middle powers, a central issue for SRM deployment prospects and associated security concerns therefore lies in how superpowers position themselves - particularly with regard to SAI. This concern relates to the ways in which planetary solar geoengineering may contribute to an evolution in the concept and exercise of state power, which can be understood as “the ability of a political unit to impose its will on other units.” From this perspective, SRM, as a potentially disruptive technology, could fuel dynamics akin to a technological arms race.

SRM approaches, and especially SAI, entail an unprecedented scale of human intervention, enabling states - or potentially powerful non-state actors - to influence the living conditions of current and future generations through deliberate modification of the global climate. Given that SRM deployment would likely occur unilaterally or within a small coalition of states, the transboundary consequences of such interventions raise profound questions about violations of national sovereignty and their implications for international relations. Moreover, in a context increasingly characterized by the use of both traditional and non-traditional military practices, as well as a growing blurring of the distinction between peace and war, SRM emerges as a novel instrument of state power, adding to existing military, intelligence, economic, technological, energy and diplomatic levers. 

Conclusion

SRM is already embedded in a geopolitical environment characterized by rivalry, weakened cooperation, and evolving security practices. Through mechanisms such as disagreement over deployment, attribution uncertainty, escalation pathways, knowledge asymmetries, and militarization, both its development and potential deployment interact with existing power dynamics, conflict logics, and strategic interests. Treating SRM as a neutral or purely technical response to climate change obscures these realities and underestimates the risks it may pose to international stability. Careful consideration is thus required to translate the (in)security mechanisms associated with SRM into concrete governance levers, starting from the research phase we are already in.

Acknowledging and engaging with these (in)security dynamics, however, should not be understood as a call for exceptionalism or securitization in the narrow sense.* An exceptionalist framing carries risks of its own, potentially reinforcing the very dynamics identified in this analysis. Rather, this is a call to approach SRM through an understanding of security that moves beyond exceptionalism, recognizing that this framework falls short in providing insights into the current practices of climate security. Indeed, given that SRM is often framed as a potential protection tool to prevent the adverse effects of climate change - a dimension that will be explored in a subsequent piece - it is important to adapt our understanding and study of SRM as a security issue accordingly.

It is therefore important to distinguish between a descriptive and analytical claim: that SRM is embedded in and generates security implications; and a normative claim: that (governance) efforts should be pursued to avoid and prevent the capture of SRM by narrow, exceptionalist security logics. Any serious engagement with SRM governance-building must therefore confront its geopolitical and security dimensions head-on, rather than relegating them to the margins of specialist knowledge communities or dismissing them out of fear that exceptionalist dynamics might take hold.

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*The securitization theory developed by Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan is understood as “processes in which the socially and politically successful ‘speech act’ of labelling an issue as a security issue removes it from the realm of normal day- to-day politics, casting it as an existential threat calling for and justifying extreme measures” see: C.A.S.E Collective. (2006). Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto. Security Dialogue. 37(4). p.453.

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This commentary reflects the independent analysis of the author, produced as part of DSG's Early Career Residency Program. The views expressed are the author's own and do not represent the positions or views of DSG. DSG's Residency Program is designed to support fellows in developing and publishing rigorous scholarship on SRM governance from their own areas of expertise.